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Abstract 
This study investigates how present exchange rate arrangements increase or reduce financial 
fragility of Central and East European countries, hence, the risk of a currency crisis, 
particularly when the countries will enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the 
European Union. Financial fragility stems from moral hazard, original sin, and commitment 
problems. The study finds that moral hazard plays a minor role in explaining financial 
fragility in candidate countries. More problems result from original sin and commitment 
problems, the latter being closely related to the law enforcement weaknesses of transition 
countries. In that constellation, an independent float as in case of the Polish zloty, remains 
more or less ineffective in reducing financial fragility. The study finds further that the 
currency boards of Bulgaria, Estonia, and Lithuania, and the managed floats of the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia have recently presented the best results in reducing financial 
fragility. Finally, the study finds that the switch to the ERM will probably increase the 
financial fragility of Poland since the currency appreciated more during the float period than 
before. With an overvalued currency, increased sterilisation efforts might lead to liquidity 
constraints. Otherwise, expected depreciation might trigger speculative attacks. The currency 
boards of Estonia and Lithuania (and, in perspective, of Bulgaria) seem to be sustainable in 
the ERM II test phase, and they can be made compatible with the ERM II rules.  
Keywords: Transition countries, EMU, exchange rates, financial crises 
JEL: E58, F3 
1. Introduction 
Since the currency crises in South East Asia, economists have recognized that the proper 
choice of the exchange rate arrangement (ERA) results not only from the applied monetary 
policy regime or the source of stochastic shocks, but also from structural factors, particularly 
from a weak financial intermediary sector (see also Calvo, 1996). Financial fragility describes 
the covariate vulnerability of a country against a currency crisis triggered off by a financial 
sector (banking) crisis. The ERA plays a different role in banking crisis models than in 
currency crisis models. Currency crises models explain why and when a speculative attack 
against a government controlled exchange rate will succeed, and which role macroeconomic 
fundamentals play. The consequence might be a banking crisis (via the loss of liquidity). The 
political conclusion drawn from those models is to shift to a corner solution either to ensure 
monetary independence (float) or to ensure no-monetary policy (currency board). Financial 
crisis models root in bank run models, and the determinants behind are defects and the 
incompleteness of the financial sector. Recent financial crisis models try to explain why the 
financial sector might run out of liquidity and might cause a currency crisis even in case of a 
corner solution. The question now reads, how the ERA limits or widens financial fragility.  
This study concentrates on the constraints financial fragility imposes on the choice of the 
ERA in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. These countries started transition 
to a market economy a decade earlier when their banking sector was less developed than in 
East Asian or Latin American countries. Most of the CEE countries will soon become 
members of the European Union (EU) and will adopt the Euro after a precisely defined 
preparation period (the ERM II stage). The problem to be discussed here is the possible 
dilemma that emerges when countries have to forfeit their exchange rate arrangement, chosen 
in order to lower the financial crisis risk potential, and accept the ERM II rules that were 
developed according to the specific monetary policy regime of the EU.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the present ERA in 
CEE countries and the vulnerability of these countries against a financial crisis. Section 3 will 
explore the nature of financial fragility from a more conceptual viewpoint. Section 4 discusses 
the roots of financial fragility in CEE countries. We focus on the corner solution: the float in 
Poland, and the currency boards in the Baltic countries Section 5 confronts the ERA of 
candidate countries with the rules of EMU membership. Using the case of Hungary, we 
illustrate how the ERM II solution might increase financial fragility. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Financial fragility and corner solutions 
After fundamental liberalisation of financial markets in developed countries and of capital 
accounts worldwide, a number of currency crises have upset the South East Asian, Latin 
American and Eastern Europe economies in the last two decades. Fixed exchange rates were 
the first victims of speculative attacks against the respective currencies (Fisher, 2001). In 
reaction, we observe a shift away from government controlled exchange rate arrangements 
towards floats and hard pegs (Chart 1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Like in East Asia and Latin America, most CEE countries underwent strong pressure on their 
currencies. The reaction was, as in other regions, a shift away from government controlled 
exchange rate arrangements towards currency boards or floats (Chart 2), whereby Bulgaria 
shifted from the one corner (float) to the other (currency board). Some governments decided 
from the very beginning of transition to start with a corner solution (currency board: Estonia, 
Lithuania; float: Bulgaria, Slovenia). The governments of other countries decided for 
controlled ERA in order to stabilise the economy after the first transition shocks. However, a 
number of currency crises challenged this approach, among them in Bulgaria, Romania, and 
the Czech Republic 1997, or in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine in 1998. Did this shift ease the 
pressure on the exchange rate stemming from financial fragility? 
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Chart 2: Exchange rate arrangements in Central and East European countries 
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Fundamental currency crisis models lost their predictive power in the Asian crises in 1997. 
New model generations lost their predictive power even in theoretical terms because of their 
non-linearity which makes the outbreak of a crisis unforeseeable under multiple equilibrium 
conditions.i Therefore, measuring a country’s vulnerability to financial crises became one of 
the leading areas in empirical research, assuming that many determinants may trigger off a 
crisis. One example is the signals approach of Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1997) who 
analysed the behaviour of 18 macroeconomic and banking sector variables before a crisis. A 
logit/probit approach was offered by Frankel and Rose (1996) and Eichengreen, Rose , and 
Wyplosz (1996). All these approaches try to capture traditional ‘fundamentals’ – mainly in the 
real of fiscal and monetary policies – and ‘new’ fundamentals although they might have only 
weak links to theory. 
Adopting the signals approach, Brüggemann and Linne (2002) constructed a composite 
indicator for CEE countries. They calculated the conditional probability of a financial crisis. 
They found the highest probability for a financial crisis in CEE with 86% (Poland), which is a 
relatively high value compared with other international studies.  
Table 4: Conditional probabilities of a crisis in CEE countries; June 2001 
Index of the 
composite indicator 
Conditional proba-
bility of a crisis 
Index for CEE countries 
0 – 20 0.2143 Bulgaria (CB) 
21 – 40 0.1781 Slovak Republic (mf) 
41 – 60 0.2813 Estonia (CB), Latvia (fp), Slovenia (mf) 
61 – 80 0.2250 Czech Republic (mf), Romania (mf) 
81 – 100 0.2593 Lithuania (CB) 
121 – 140 0.6154 Hungary (fb, ± 15 %) 
 > 141 0.8571 Poland (float) 
Legend: CB = Currency Board, mf = managed float, fp = fix peg, fb = fix band. 
Source: Brüggemann and Linne, 2002. 
From this empirical perspective, the corner solutions are by no means a save haven against a 
currency crisis (see Argentina for the break down of a currency board). Behind this picture, 
hence, is not only a violation of the applied monetary rule, but assumingly also an increase in 
financial fragility. 
3. On the nature of financial fragility 
The empirical findings illustrates, that the nature of financial fragility makes the choice of the 
optimal exchange rate arrangement more complicated than in the traditional Mundell-Fleming 
framework. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) condense three hypotheses from the recent 
literature explaining financial fragility: moral hazard, original sin, and the commitment 
problem (see Box 1). 
Box 1: Explaining financial fragility – three hypotheses 
Moral hazard 
Moral hazard of agents who borrow abroad is likely when they can expect to be bailed out. 
Bailing out means the existence of explicit or implicit guarantees given by a third party 
(the government, or an international institution like the IMF). Corporations and banks are 
not forced to hedge their foreign exposures. The result is excessive risk-taking. 
Original sin 
A history of high inflation and strong and frequent depreciation undermines confidence in 
the currency of the borrowing country. The currency is not accepted as international 
reserve money, that is, lenders do not accept debt in this currency. Banks and corporations 
are not able to hedge their foreign exposure. The result is a currency and/or maturity 
mismatch of assets and liabilities. 
Commitment problem 
Financial contracts are charged over time. If law enforcement is weak, if there is a lack of 
collateral, or if the institutional framework is weak, the willingness to repay could be 
constrained. The consequence could be high spreads on interest that increase financial 
fragility. 
Moral hazard means that agents feel sure to be bailed out if they encounter repayment 
difficulties. Explicit or implicit guarantees prevent them from hedging their foreign exposures 
against the FX risk. A pegged exchange rate is an implicit guarantee given by the Central 
Bank, mainly to banks and to the government. The costs of this guarantee are normally 
outweighed by the gains a pegged exchange rate offers. If moral hazard led to excessive risk 
taking by the banking sector, the cost might outweight the gains. The banking sector might 
expand its balance sheet without being limited by its equity capital. The literature describes 
over-borrowing abroad (McKinnon and Pill 1997) and a lending boom (Krugman 1998) as 
possible consequences: most of short-term financed investment is allocated in assets. 
Increased demand for assets is often constrained by supply (land or stock shares), hence, asset 
prices rise, the quality of bank assets deteriorates, and lending rates increase. The Central 
bank comes more and more under pressure to put a brake on increasing interest rates. When 
domestic credit exceeds the amount that trade and real growth can absorb, capital inflows 
might reverse, and the asset bubble bursts. If moral hazard constitutes the main source of 
financial fragility, then the literature recommends the move to an independent float in order to 
force agents to hedge risks.ii 
With a float, the financial fragility will not diminish when the borrowers of a country are not 
able to hedge. Hedging means that there is a final lender who accepts debt in the domestic 
currency of the borrower. Borrowers in developing countries often have difficulties hedging 
their foreign exposure since hedging might be too costly, or the currency is generally not 
accepted. Why borrowers of a country are unable to hedge is not very clear. A certain history 
of inflation and strong depreciation (Eichengreen and Hausmann) may play a role, hence, the 
term ‘original sin’. When agents expect depreciation with an independent float, they might 
purchase foreign exchange to cover their exposures with the consequence of further 
depreciation. The likely outcome is a high volatility of interest rates. A typical sign of an 
existing original-sin problem is a maturity mismatch. It evolves when long-term investment is 
financed by short-term international credit.  
The inability to hedge is often coupled with an open foreign exchange position of banks, that 
is, foreign liabilities exceed foreign assets. But even with a balanced net foreign exchange 
position, banks are not automatically safer. Since banks tend to carry over the currency risk on 
their domestic borrowers by foreign currency loans (FCLs), their foreign position might seem 
balanced at first glance. The FX risk, however, moves  from the banks to the company sector 
or private households. On the demand side, the non-banking sector might be increasingly 
attracted by borrowing in foreign currency, since it is a typical feature of original-sin 
countries that the nominal interest rate on domestic credits is higher than on foreign credits.  
A severe currency mismatch might occur when the stream of income from investment 
financed by FCLs yields only revenues in domestic currency. The same applies with loans to 
private households since they earn their income exclusively in domestic currency. With an 
independent float, depreciation would increase the debt service cost associated with the 
foreign currency loan. More defaults in the company or private household sector would 
damage the liquidity position of banks. Although depreciation increases the book value of 
their assets in domestic currency, the value of liquidation might shrink considerably below the 
book value when the company sector runs into trouble.  
Original sin problems are the reason why central banks all around the world are reluctant to 
let the market do its work, and raise interest rates or follow a managed (‘dirty’) float. Two 
reasons might explain the reluctance to rely on the market: (a) the fear that depreciation due to 
the given inflation differential could seriously hurt the still vulnerable domestic banking and 
non-banking sector; and (b), the concern that depreciation could lead to higher inflation and 
thereby damage the monetary authorities’ reputation. With these typical original sin problems, 
the fear is that depreciation would trigger a downturn in investors' confidence and result in 
even sharper reversals in net capital inflows.  
A fixed peg is not an alternative. If the central bank tried to defend the peg by interest hikes, 
the liquidity situation of corporations, banks, and the government would deteriorate, short-
term capital would then usually fill the gap, and a maturity mismatch would raise financial 
fragility. The trade-off between defending the peg and other aims of the government might 
lead to multiple equilibrium and self-fulfilling currency crises. 
Is a currency board a safer haven? The classical currency board is characterised as a 
constitutionally backed prohibition to sterilise. The central bank cannot take money from the 
market to defend the peg nor can it provide money (= loss of lender-of-last-resort function). 
Two possible risks then emerge: (1) Financial fragility could increase due to spill-over effects 
from trade shocks, when the currency of the main trading partner devalues. The recent 
collapse of Argentina’s currency provides a striking example.iii (2) A currency board is not 
immune to a bank run that severely hurts the liquidity position of banks. On the other hand, 
lending in the base currency would not pose any problem. The financial risks are the reason 
why pure currency boards are so rare. Central banks intend to keep some reserves out of 
money circulation ensuring a certain lender-of-last resort function, and to keep some tools for 
managing the money supply (minimum reserve holding of banks, for example). 
The literature offers no currency as the better solution. Indeed, mismatch problems, as well as 
too much risk-taking, would not appear with complete dollarisation or euroisation. The typical 
feature of a country considering dollarisation in order to avoid financial instability is, 
however, the lack of international reserves of the central bank or the banking sector. The 
longer and the more severe the history of inflation and devaluation of a country, the less the 
public’s confidence in monetary authorities and the banking system. If 
dollarisation/euroisation yielded the expected fall of interest rates, deposit holders would 
transfer their deposits from vulnerable domestic banks to safer foreign banks (or their 
affiliates in the country). Dollarisation might trigger a bank run, and if the reserve position 
were too small, a liquidity crisis would break out and spread over the entire economy. 
A currency board or no-currency is not a solution either when agents are unwilling to hedge 
or to repay. This unwillingness is the direct consequence of weak commitment devices the 
modern financial world provides. With developing financial derivatives and financial 
institutions, the close tie between claim and collateral broke. An enforcement problem in 
countries with a weak institutional framework and property rights might increase the 
commitment problem. Weak property rights simply destroy the function of real assets as 
collateral. Russia provides an example, but borrowers in Asian countries were also suspected 
of being unwilling to repay their foreign or domestic lenders, often trying to hide 
unwillingness behind inability.  
The implications for exchange rate policies are, however, less obvious. Where the financial 
infrastructure is least developed, and ownership is under question as in transition countries, 
the markets may most need a lender of last resort, who needs the freedom granted by a 
flexible exchange rate policy (Eichengreen and Hausmann). A currency board or dollarisation 
are no means to reduce financial fragility if it stems from a commitment problem. On the 
other hand, in case of a float, commitment problems cause lenders to demand higher spreads, 
which might trigger a self-fulfilling crisis through expected devaluation. 
The commitment problem is closely linked to the institutional settings of the financial sector 
in crisis countries. When capital account restrictions are lifted, the quality of supervision and 
monitoring of the financial sector (Williamson and Miller, 1998), as well as the degree of 
international integration of the banking industry, plays a role in increasing or reducing 
financial fragility. A low quality and integration first hit Japan’s economy when financial 
deregulation and a loose monetary policy started in the 1980s, causing a ‘slow-moving 
financial crisis’ between 1991 and 1996 (Fukao, 2001), with severe impacts on the other 
Asian economies. Foreign ownership, for example, might help to improve monitoring and 
auditing, and can even substitute for the lender-of-last-resort function of the central bank, 
thus, a fixed peg becomes more sustainable. Chan-Lau and Chen (1998) note that countries 
such as Hong-Kong (currency board) and Singapore (managed float) had better supervision 
and monitoring, developed from longer experience in financial business, and were less prone 
to financial crises, if not immune to them. Both countries are rather small, and their banking 
industry is completely integrated into the international financial world.  
4. Financial fragility and exchange rate arrangements in Central 
and Eastern Europe 
4.1 Is moral hazard the main problem? 
The moral-hazard hypothesis predicts that capital flows should be large or, much more than 
´socially optimal` (Eichengreen and Hausmann). Actually, capital flows seem to be rather low 
(Table 1). The share of the consolidatediv international claims of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis 
Eastern Europe in their GDP accounted for a mere 0.7% – by far less than for Western 
Europe. There seems to be, however, some difference between countries with a float and a 
peg. The ´Peggers` (countries with a fixed peg, a narrow crawling band, or a currency board, 
marked with a ‘P’) tend to show a higher share than countries with a flexible arrangement. 
Estonia is a remarkable case with a share of 33.3%. On the other hand, we find Poland with its 
independent float and a share of only 0.1%. 
There is still a lack of clear determination about what is ‘socially optimal’. Krugman (1998) 
pointed out that investors, having two alternatives of a low risk asset with low returns and a 
high-risk asset with high returns, are inclined to put their money into the highly risky asset 
when moral hazard prevails. Investors simply believe they can leave a country even when the 
investment fails and there is somebody who bails out. Without the bailing out option,  
investors would prefer the low risk asset in a second country. Hence, the moral-hazard 
hypothesis predicts that capital inflows will address mainly banks and the government, which 
most likely will benefit from a bailout. Banks are more likely to be bailed out by the 
government or the central bank than private companies due to the perceived threat to 
macroeconomic and financial stability. Governments are also likely to be bailed out by 
international aid, for example, granted by the IMF. The sector structure of foreign capital 
investment may serve as an indicator for moral hazard. The BIS statistics show that the share 
of consolidated international claims of reporting banks vis-à-vis banks and governments is 
lower for CEE countries, Asian countries, and Latin America than for Western Europe, with 
Russia being the exception. Peg arrangements show an even lower share than float 
arrangements, though it should be the reverse if the moral-hazard hypothesis were to hold. 
High capital inflow to Estonia should be seen as a moral hazard sign only if the structure were 
in favour of claims against banks and the government. Most foreign investment, however, is 
long-term and in the private non-banking sector. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lending to Asian and Pacific, Latin Amercan and Caribbean countries, and to Eastern Europe 
concentrates more on the non-bank private sector than in developed countries. The low share 
of lending to banks and governments in CEE is rather an indicator for the original sin and 
commitment view. In regions with a weak banking sector, international lenders prefer debtors 
who can provide a solid collateral. While banks can only provide their reputation, the private 
company sector offers more solid insurance. 
Table 1: Consolidated international claims of BIS reporting banks on individual 
countries 
End June 2000, sectors, and short-term in % of total 
Absolute size in % of total claims Claims vis-a-vis Absolute 
change of total 
claims in % of 
GDP 2000a Banks Public 
sector 
Non-bank 
private 
sector and 
others 
short-
term up 
to one 
year 
Western Europe 2.1 56.9 12.5 30.6 60.4 
Eastern Europe 0.7 44.8 14.4 40.8 32.2 
Bulgaria (P) 0.2 23.5 41.1 35.3 23.7 
Czech Republic 1.1 39.0 10.0 51.0 52.0 
Estonia (P) 33.3 27.1 2.3 70.6 33.5 
Hungary (P) 3.4 42.5 22.4 35.2 30.6 
Latvia (P) 3.7 34.9 11.8 53.4 33.6 
Lithuania (P) 3.0 28.2 28.2 43.7 46.3 
Poland 0.1 32.2 20.9 46.9 37.2 
Romania 1.0 22.2 8.6 69.3 39.2 
Russia 4.2 60.3 7.6 32.1 26.0 
Slovakia 3.3 10.9 23.2 65.9 38.4 
Slovenia 1.7 32.9 31.3 35.8 20.8 
Asia & Pacific n. a. 35.9 12.7 51.4 47.2 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
 
0.0 18.4 20.4 61.3 47.3 
a Ch ge End June 1999-End June 2000, in m  of US dollars.  
Source: BIS; IMF; own calculation
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The share of short-term debt is another indicator for the nature of financial fragility. The 
moral hazard view includes the idea that the exchange-rate insurance implied by a policy of 
pegging the currency is most credible over the short horizon. A high share of short-term 
lending might also support the original sin hypothesis when it is the sign of a maturity 
mismatch. Figures, however, show only a small share of short-term lending to Eastern Europe 
compared to Western Europe, Asia and the Pacific, or Latin America. Float arrangements 
even show the highest shares of short-term lending (Czech Republic, Romania, Poland).  
Table 2: Public debt indictors of selected candidate countries (central government) 
-- IMF standard (SDSS) -- 
of which short term in % Country Date bn $ 
total domestic 
currency 
foreign 
currency 
in % of 
GDP 
of which 
short-
term in %
Bulgaria Oct 2001 9.280 4.1 0.7 3.4 71.0 2.9 
Czech 
Republic 
Sept 2001 8.000 51.3 51.3 0.0 12.7 6.5 
Estonia Sept 2001 0.160 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.0 
Hungarya Sept 2001 29.600 21.6 17.4 4.2 58.7 12.7 
Latvia Sept 2001 1.027 7.3 7.3 0.0 53.9 3.9 
Lithuania Nov 2001 3.277 5.0 5.0 0.0 29.0 1.5 
Polanda Sept 2001 75.9 7.2 7.2 0.0 44.2 4.5 
Russia Sept 2001 158.0 62.9 6.6 1.5 5.1 4.1 
Slovenia June 2001 4.848 n. a. n. a. n. a. 27.3 n. a.  
a Including guaranteed debt. 
S urces: Websites of national finance ministries, statistical offices or nation l banks; own calcul tions.  
Public short-term debt or mass privatisation is one of the driving forces for emerging 
domestic debt and security markets. Moral hazard should not play a significant role when the 
government does not run fiscal deficits financed by T-bills, or when privatisation is based 
upon (foreign) direct investment. In general, debt and equity markets are too small in CEE 
countries to attract large foreign portfolio inflows.v Estonia serves as an example where short-
term public debt was zero (Table 2). To sum up, data on capital flows and debt structure 
indicate rather problems that depend on commitment and original sin problems, the latter 
representing a maturity mismatch. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Further insights provide data on the foreign exchange position and lending activities of the 
banks in foreign currency. Net foreign exchange liabilities inform roughly about unhedged 
positions. Unhedged positions might represent moral hazard when the exchange rate is 
controlled by the central bank. Inspecting the few available data (Table 3) shows that in 1996, 
most banking sectors had net foreign assets. With more or less flexible exchange rates, 
foreign exposures were covered. There were only two exceptions: the Czech Republic and 
Bulgaria. In May 1997, the Czech Republic suffered a severe currency crisis and was forced 
to give up the fixed peg. The banks’ foreign exposure was completely hedged in the two years 
preceding the crisis. This demonstrates that the lack of hedging or moral hazard was likely not 
the main factor responsible for the crisis.  Bulgaria slid into a crisis from 1996-97 with a 
managed float. The high open foreign exchange position of the Bulgarian banking sector 
indicates that despite the managed float, banks were not able or willing to hedge until after the 
currency board was introduced in 1997.  
Table 3: Net foreign exchange positions of domestic banks in relation to total assets in 
selected countries, 1994 throughout 1998, in %  
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Bulgaria ….. -61.7 -55.4 22.6 26.6 
Czech Republic 3.3 -5.4 -5.1 5.1 6.7 
Estonia 23.1 14.0 1.0 -12.9 -13.1 
Poland 12.5 7.8 4.7 4.1 -1.1 
Romania 7.5 4.9 2.8 4.5 -0.5 
Russia ….. 4.7 2.8 -6.6 -1.3 
Slovakia 5.9 4.3 1.7 3.5 6.6 
Source: Brüggemann et al. (2000) with further source information. 
4.2 The pitfalls of an independent float: the case of Poland 
When moral hazard is not prevailing, an independent float cannot prevent financial fragility. 
This shall be briefly discussed by hand of the case of Poland. The National Bank of Poland 
gradually increased the flexibility of the zloty. With capital account liberalisation in 1995, 
capital inflows gained momentum, and the flexibility of the zloty significantly increased when 
the band around the central parity was widened from ± 2.5% to ± 7% in May 1995. The 
National Bank expanded the band to ± 10% in February 1998, ± 12.5% in October, and to 
± 15% in March 1999. The band was abandoned in April 2000 when the National Bank 
declared an independent float. Although Poland’s economy did not suffer from a financial 
crisis, its vulnerability has increased since the zloty started to float independently. This 
increase stemmed from a real appreciation initiated by strong capital inflows. 
If moral hazard was the root of financial fragility, and if agents had rational expectations, 
hedging activities should have prevented an excessive deviation of the free spot exchange rate 
from the purchasing power parity. In Chart 4, the exchange rate’s hypothetical course 
following the purchasing power parity was extrapolated with the trend line of the central 
parity (the latter valid until 11 April, 2000). The gap between the hypothetical central parity 
and the actual exchange rate widened in Euro terms until July 2001. The zloty came under 
speculative pressure in July 2001 for the first time since the Russian financial crisis in August 
1998 and depreciated by about 13 % within two weeks. Raising its interest rate, the National 
Bank prevented the zloty from further devaluating. The price, however, was more attractive 
for short-term portfolio inflows causing an appreciation since then. Increasing conflicts 
between the National Bank and the Polish government about interest policies was at the root 
of the debate on an unilateral introduction of the Euro in Poland (Bratkowski and Rostowski, 
2001) 
Applying the signals approach, the composite indicator shows an increasing risk potential for 
the Zloty since April 2000 pointing out that the strategy to lower the risk and to find the 
equilibrium exchange rate for ERM entry by floating failed (Chart 5).  
Chart 4: The exchange rate of the Polish zloty between 4 January 1999 until 31 
December 2001 
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Chart 5: The composite indicator for the Polish Zloty between August 1997– June 2001 
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Source: Brüggemann and Linne, 2002.  
Why financial fragility increased in Poland? (1) Capital inflows served trade financing and 
liquidity trade (derivatives etc.), but were also attracted by domestic equity and debt markets. 
Mass privatisation schemesvi established an equity market large enough to attract foreign 
portfolio investors. Public debt (44% of GDP in the third quarter of 2001) was among the 
highest compared with other transition countries, and a relatively high share (4.5%) was in T-
bills. Although there were some official restrictions on short-term capital flows, the National 
Bank handled them liberally. (2) Privatisation of banks has gained momentum since 1998. 
The banking sector was overwhelmingly privately owned with 56% of foreign share in 
statutory capital in 2002. However, banks still held a relatively high share of bad performing 
loans in their portfolio in 1999 (14% compared to 9% in Hungary), illustrating commitment 
problems in the economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(3) Foreign currency loans of banks to the private households increased significantly (Table 
4). At the end of 2001, these loans were at one third of all outstanding FCLs to the private 
sector. Any depreciation of the zloty would increase the debt service costs of private 
households (and companies).vii This currency mismatch was likely one of the reasons why the 
National Bank tried to prevent depreciation when inflation exceeded the targeted path from 
2000-2001.viii Otherwise, an expected weakening of the zloty might have led the private 
households to purchase FX in order to service the debt. The result might have been a self-
fulfilling crisis.  
Table 4: FCL of Polish banks  
 in % of 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
total banks loans 14.1 17.1 22.8 20.5 22.7 27.6 
loans to Corporations 16.5 20.3 27.1 25.5 26.8 28.1 
loans to Persons 1.7 3.5 5.9 5.4 10.7 20.1 
housing loans 2.2 8.1 8.9 9.4 23.6 51.0 
Source: National Bank of Poland website. 
4.3 Why have the Currency Boards survived? 
Among the Baltic countries, Estonia and Lithuania have long-lasting currency boards, and 
Latvia has a fixed peg.ix In first approximation, these pegs survived due to the relatively small 
financial markets and the almost complete international integration of the banking industry 
(Sutela, 2001). The sizes of equity and debt markets is not attractive for large international 
investors. The relative sizes of debt markets is small due to low public debt. Public debt was 
at 3.2% of GDP (2001) in Estonia, but short-term debt was zero (Table 2). Short-term public 
debt in terms of GDP was 1.5% in Lithuania, and in Bulgaria (having another currency board) 
2.9%. Privatisation in the Baltic countries (as in Hungary) followed patterns of direct sales to 
strategic investors; equity markets remained small. Hence, most capital inflows are long-term 
(FDI) or trade-related (short-term). Most banks in Estonia are in foreign ownership. There is, 
simply said, little room for moral hazard problems. 
Add to this that Baltic currency boards are more like fixed peg arrangements. From the very 
beginning, the money base of Estonia was more than covered by international reserves and the 
central bank could use them if the banking sector ran into liquidity problems. Hence, the Eesti 
Pank has a lender-of-last resort function (which in a pure currency board is non-existent). 
What is more, all ‘currency boards’ include the option of changing obligatory reserves for 
sterilisation purposes. To fight off speculative attacks during the Asian crises, the Eesti Pank 
increased obligatory reserves in mid 1997.x Defending the fixed peg this way generated some 
liquidity bottlenecks in the banking sector with the consequence of higher interest rates. 
Upon further consideration, a fixed peg with restricted sterilisation (lender of last resort 
capabilities) may collapse due to spill-over effects from trade shocks when the currency 
appreciates in real terms. When the Russian rouble depreciated in fall 1998, the former Baltic 
Soviet republics were hit only marginally. Russia absorbs only 6.8 % of Estonia’s exports, 
4.2% of Latvia’s exports, and 7.1% of Lithuania’s exports. The share of the EU in exports is 
between 48% (Lithuania) and 69% (Estonia).xi Nevertheless, spill-over effects on 
fundamentals could be observed in the composite risk indicator for all three countries. 
5. Financial Fragility and EMR II: the case of Hungary 
After accession to the European Union, EU candidate countries are obliged to make all 
necessary preparations in order to become a member of the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
and to introduce the Euro; no opting-out is possible. The ERM rules include:  
(a) a central parity of the country’s currency against the euro within a relatively wide band of 
± 15% and intra-marginal intervention points inside of this band, 
(b) voluntary intra-marginal interventions of the central bank with its own reserves, 
(c) automatic interventions at the intra-marginal points with interest bearing credit facilities 
of the ECB (the central bank of the country acts as an affiliate of the ECB), and 
(d) a term of ERM membership of at least two years in which voluntary interventions should 
be only moderate (with successful convergence of interest and inflation rates and 
fulfilling the fiscal criteria). 
The central parity is to be negotiated between the European Council, which the European 
Central Bank recommends, and the government of the new member country; no country can 
set the parity autonomously. The bandwidth may be smaller, but this is also to be negotiated 
with the European Council (Denmark negotiated a band of ± 2.5%). Upon request by the 
member country, the EU can consider shortening the two-year term. Central banks are also 
obliged to defend the band by effective monetary policies, including sterilisation. At first 
glance, the wide band seems to be very close to a floating exchange rate. The automatic 
interventions and the requirements mentioned under (d) characterise the ERM II, however, 
rather as a test under a fixed exchange rate. 
Here, the problem emerges very clearly: with financial fragility, will the premature return to a 
fixed peg raise the risk for a currency crisis? We discuss this problem with the case of 
Hungary. 
Among today’s ERA only the Hungarian arrangement is most compatible with the ERM II 
rules, and the switch to this regime illustrates the problem of increasing vulnerability against a 
crisis. The composite indicator reports a strong increase to about 120, that reflects a 
conditional probability of a crisis of 62% in May 2001 compared with 28% in March (Chart 
6). 
Chart 6: The composite indicator for the Hungarian Forint between June 1996 – May 
2001 
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Daily average exchange rates
6. Conclusions 
Among all exchange rate arrangements, the independent float of the Polish zloty is at the 
highest variance to the ERM. When, as we suspect, the nature of financial fragility is in 
original sin and commitment problems, the independent float is not a successful way to find 
the equilibrium exchange rate. The central bank,  in its aim to lower the risk of a sudden 
reversal of capital inflows, would be forced to increase interest rates. If the currency 
appreciates in real terms instead of depreciating, the float contributes to higher vulnerability, 
because the real appreciation and the high interest rates lure additional short-term capital into 
the country. The consequence might be a currency and maturity mismatch with a strong 
exposure of the non-banking sector to the FX risk. Entering the ERM with that burden would 
be a very risky undertaking. The critical aspect is the negotiation of the fixed euro/zloty parity 
between the EU (ECB) and the National Bank. If markets expect an initial devaluation 
because they assume the zloty to be overvalued, a speculative attack on the zloty might occur 
on the eve of ERM membership.xii The currency mismatch might trigger a banking crisis. If 
the overvalued zloty entered the ERM, strong adjustments in the company and banking sector 
might lead to income and liquidity losses, both of which would increase the fragility of the 
banking sector. From this point of view, the switch from the independent float of the zloty to a 
fixed peg is the riskiest undertaking among the candidate countries. Unilateral euroisation 
would deepen the problem of violation of the ERM II rules. is not a convincing way out. A 
transitory solution leading the Zloty toward equilibrium seems necessary, possibly a switch to 
a managed float. 
At the other end of the scale, does the switch of a currency board to ERM II increase financial 
fragility in the Baltics (and later in Bulgaria)? The answer is, in principle, yes. With a 
currency board, there is no exchange rate risk, but an interest rate risk although the exchange 
rate is fixed. With a fix band, moral hazard of the financial sector might be the immediate 
consequence since either the central bank or the ECB gives an implicit guarantee. With this 
implicit guarantee, markets could test the parity. The limited ability of central banks to 
sterilise could be a problem for monetary convergence (inflation and interest rates). Hence, 
entering the ERM II with a currency board seems to be the least risky strategy. However, the 
EU does not regard a currency board as an acceptable substitute for participating in ERM II 
(Ecofin, 2001). But a currency board offers possibilities for a convergence test required for 
ERM. A currency board is a fixed peg with a ± 0% band. In terms of ERM, the central bank 
would have access to ECB credits in any case of intervention. This is a matter of negotiation; 
the currency board countries could enter the ERM with a ± 0% band, but only without any 
commitment of the ECB to common interventions at least at that point. The risk for moral 
hazard could be restricted. Convergence could be tested by the interest rate and the inflation 
criterion. 
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i For an overview see Flood and Marion (1998). 
ii Another recommendation is to restrict capital account liberalisation. This will not be discussed in this study 
since we are concentrating on the exchange rate issue. 
iii The Peso was tied to the US dollar, but only 12% of trade was conducted with the US and 30% with Brasil. 
The real depreciated in January 1999 by 40%, hurting Argentina’s international competitiveness. The country 
slid into a severe recession, and financial markets lost trust in the country’s ability to repay. 
iv Consolidated means ,  among other things,  that positions between offices of the same bank are netted out.  
v The CEE country with the highest number of traded bonds in 2000 was Slovakia (108). In Estonia, only 6 
bonds were traded. The London debt market includes 5,300 bonds. On equity markets, market capitalisation 
ratios reached from 3.1% in Romania to 35% in Estonia in 2000 (EBRD 2001). Market capitalisation was 
130% in Frankfurt, 185% in London, and 719% in Paris. 
vi Considering the political controversy in Poland about the delays in privatisation, I refer to various issues of 
the EBRD’s transition report. Mass privatisation (= large privatisation in Poland) was of minor importance 
compared with the Czech Republic or Slovakia, but ‘large’ enough to fuel the stock market. 
vii Private households are somewhat protected against the FX risk by the option to re-denominate the FX loans 
into Zloty loans at a certain fee. Credit costs would, however, increase in this case since the domestic interest 
rates are higher and would soar if the Zloty would weaken. The vulnerability of the banking sector would by 
no means decrease. 
viii The National Bank followed direct inflation targeting. 
ix Monetary policy rules are very strict; sometimes the Latvian peg is called a ‘quasi currency board’. 
x Eesti Pank, Annual Report 1997, Tallin. 
xi Something similar holds for Bulgaria: only 2.5% of exports go to Russia. 
xii One should note that the Greek drachma entered the ERM with a 15% devalued rate, without any prior 
speculative attack. This devaluation was a surprise to the markets. 
